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Abstract
I explore the eﬀect of skill-biased technological change on long-run inequality using a theoretical
model where the supply of skilled and unskilled workers, the cost of education, and credit rationing
are endogenous. I show that the existence of unequal steady states does not depend on the degree
of technological skill bias, but on the credit market, the cost of education, altruism, and the
overall growth rate of the economy. However, when unequal steady states exist, economies with a
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1 Introduction
The evolution of the wage structure in the United States between the end of the 1970s
and the beginning of the 1990s suggests that technology can, in the short run, increase
inequality. During this period, the diﬀerence between the average wage of workers with
a college degree and of workers with a high school degree increased signiﬁcantly. The
reason was the introduction of the personal computer and the unfolding of the information
technology era. This wave of innovations was skill biased : it increased the productivity
of skilled workers (workers with a college degree), leaving unchanged the productivity of
unskilled workers.1
However, the long-run impact of technology on inequality is not well understood. Con-
trary to the short run, in the long-run the supply of skilled workers is endogenous: after an
increase in the skill bias the number of skilled workers may increase. The possible reasons
are:
• Parents may be willing to spend more on the education of their children when the
return on education is higher.
• Student loans have an implicit collateral: the student's future wage. When the wage
is higher, more people should be able to access the credit market and ﬁnance their
education.
In addition, the short-run cost of education is ﬁxed, but, since college professors are skilled
workers, the long-run college tuition is likely to be correlated with the skilled wage. There-
fore, the impact of an increase in the skilled wage on the net return of the skilled profession
is ambiguous.
Here I explore the eﬀect of skill-biased technological change on long-run inequality by
building an overlapping generation model where the supply of diﬀerent types of skills is
endogenous and may respond to variation in the skill bias The key elements are:
• Altruistic parents who leave bequests to their children.
• An imperfect credit market where young people can raise resources to ﬁnance their
education.
• An endogenous cost of education.
Note that each of these elements introduces a new potential source of inequality: altruism,
credit market imperfections, and the cost of education. These elements can aﬀect the supply
1 For empirical evidence, see, among many others, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2005), and Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998).
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of skills both directly and through variations in skill bias. One of the goals of the paper
is to understand the interaction between these elements and skill-bias technological change
in the evolution of long-run inequality. Finally, the model considers only access to credit
market and education as source of inequality, and abstracts away from other determinants
of inequality like ability.
I show that technological skill bias cannot, by itself, generate long-run inequality. In-
equality exists only if some form of non convexities in the investment opportunities exist, so
that only agents with wealth above a certain level can become skilled workers. The origin of
non convexities is in the credit market, in the educational sector, in the degree of altruism
and in the overall growth rate of the economy. Skill-biased technological change plays no role
in the existence of non convexities and, therefore, in the existence of inequality. However, I
show that, if non convexities exist, skill-bias technology does increase inequality. Therefore,
skill-bias technology matters, but it is a second order determinant of long-run inequality.
The intuition behind the result is easily captured by looking at two extreme cases.
Consider an economy with no credit market. Since agents cannot borrow, the supply of
skills will be constrained and the distribution of wealth will be unequal. After an increase
in the skill bias there will be no increase in the supply of skilled workers, since the absence
of a credit market prevents agents from borrowing. Therefore, any short-run increase in
inequality due to skill-biased technological change will be permanent. On the other hand,
consider an economy with a perfectly functioning credit market, where the distribution of
wealth is equal. Since agents can freely borrow, any skill-biased technological change will
be matched by an increase in the supply of skills. In this case, skill-biased technological
change has no long-run impact on inequality.
More in general, I show that, as typical in this literature, the set of unequal steady
states is a continuum. Interestingly, here the set of possible steady-state skill premia (the
ratio of skilled and unskilled wage) does not depend on the skill bias of the economy. The
existence of a speciﬁc steady state (equal or unequal) depends on a set of constraints to
be satisﬁed. For example, in an unequal steady state unskilled workers should not be able
to borrow, and the return on the skilled profession should be higher than the return of
the unskilled one. I show that these constraints depend on technology only through the
skill premium. In the long run, the skill premium is a function of the skill bias and of
the skilled-to-unskilled ratio. Therefore, two economies diﬀering only in their skill bias will
have diﬀerent steady-state skilled-to-unskilled ratios so to keep the set of steady-state skill
premia constant.
As a consequence, the existence of long-run inequality does not depend on the degree of
technological skill bias. Long-run inequality exists when the credit market does not function
well, when the growth rate of the economy is low, when altruism is low, and when education
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is costly. Whenever unequal steady states do not exist, the unique steady state is equal:
both professions yield the same return. In this sense, skill-biased technology does not matter
because the range of possible steady state outcomes (measured in terms of skill premium)
does not change with skill bias.
After describing the steady state, I perform a stability analysis. I assume that long-run
inequality exists, and I focus on economies in steady states that are in the interior of the
unequal steady-states set. I track the convergence of these economies to their new steady
state after an arbitrarily small change in skill bias. In order to make a meaningful comparison
between economies before and after the technological shock, I build an appropriate measure
of long-run inequality that, following Atkinson (1970), depends on the whole distribution of
steady-state wealth. I show that, generically, after an arbitrarily small increase in skill bias,
the long-run skill premium and the long-run inequality both increase.
It follows that the impact of technology on inequality may be permanent: today's in-
equality may depend on the introduction of the personal computer 30 years ago. In addition,
there should be an empirical connection between initial inequality and the increase in in-
equality due to the introduction of skill-biased technology. After a skill-bias technological
shock, economies that are already unequal (because of institutional factors like the credit
market), should display a low increase in the supply of skill and a permanent increase in
inequality. On the other hand, economies that are more equal should experience a greater
increase in the supply of skills and no increase in long-run inequality.
Literature
The research on endogenous economic inequality can be roughly divided into two parts. The
ﬁrst one focuses on how variations in the demand for skills due to changes in technology
aﬀect short-run inequality. It originated with Kuznets (1955), who claimed that, since
the supply of diﬀerent types of workers does not adjust immediately, technology can cause
inequality in the short run by increasing the demand for some occupations.2 The second
part of the literature on endogenous economic inequality had its origin with Banerjee and
Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993). These authors focused on how credit market
imperfections create a non convexity in the investment opportunity, constrain the supply of
skills and generate long-run inequality. 3
Several authors tried to combine both approaches by explaining the evolution of income
inequality using both variations in the supply and variations in the demand for skills. Piketty
2 See also Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Townsend and Ueda (2006), and Galor and Moav (2000).
3 In this line of research see also Aghion and Bolton (1997); Piketty (1997); Matsuyama (2000); Mookherjee
and Ray (2003); Rigolini (2004); Mookherjee and Napel (2007); Mookherjee and Ray (2010); Mookherjee,
Prina, and Ray (2010).
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(2006) nicely explain:
[...] the impact of technology on inequality depends on a large number of
institutions, and these institutions vary a great deal over time and across coun-
tries. Chief among these are the institutions governing the supply and structure
of skills, from formal schooling institutions to on-the-job training schemes. To
a large extent, the dynamics of labor market inequality are determined by the
race between the demand for skills and the supply of skills. New technologies
tend to raise the demand for skills, but the impact on inequality depends as to
whether the supply of skills is rising at a faster or lower rate. There is no general
presumption that the race should go one way or the other.
The most prominent contribution to this literature is probably Goldin and Katz (2008).
These authors decompose the evolution of the wage structure in the US from the beginning
to the end of the twentieth century into variations in the demand for skills (technology) and
in the supply of skills, and dicuss the determinants of these variations. On the same line
there are the empirical works of Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) and Binelli (2009).
In my model, I only consider variations in the supply of skills coming from changes in the
technological skill bias. I show that the eﬀect of skill bias on the supply of skills is, in the
long run, too small compared to variations in the demand. With respect to this literature,
my model hints at the fact that, whenever we observe large increases in the supply of skilled
workers driving down the skill premium, we should probably consider factors diﬀerent than
technology to explain it.4
The only other paper exploring the long-run impact of skill-bias technological change
on inequality is Rigolini (2004), who develops an OLG model where the cost of education
is endogenous. Rigolini proves that an increase in the overall growth rate of the economy
may increase or decrease the incentive for unskilled workers to acquire education, measured
as the utility diﬀerence between an unskilled agent who remains unskilled and an unskilled
agent who decides to become skilled. He then claims (without proving it) that the same
result should apply with respect to skill-biased technological change. I show that his claim
is incorrect: the impact of an increase in skill bias does not depend on the parameters of the
utility function. A second point of departure from Rigolini is that I deﬁne inequality in a
rigorous way by building a measure that, following Atkinson (1970), depends on the whole
distribution of steady-state wealth. Finally, in my model the existence of credit rationing
is determined endogenously, and agents can accumulate assets and leave ﬁnancial bequests.
These elements are absent in Rigolini's model, but are key here because they allow me to
compare diﬀerent sources of inequality.
4 In fact, in Binelli (2009) and in Heckman et al. (1998) the supply of skills is aﬀected by, respectively,
changes in the credit market and on the job training.
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Fig. 1: Timeline
The model that is closer to mine is Mookherjee and Ray (2010). Like in their model, I
assume agents care about their oﬀspring's wealth (paternalistic altruism), I endogenize the
return on education, and I allow parents to leave both ﬁnancial and educational bequests.
However, Mookherjee and Ray (2010) focus on the existence of long-run inequality and
multiple steady states when the number of occupation in the economy increases. They
show that, as the number of occupation approaches a continuum, the steady state becomes
unique, but inequality may not disappear. Because of its diﬀerent goal, my paper departs
from Mookherjee and Ray (2010) in a number of ways. Most important, in my model the
cost of education and the existence of credit rationing evolve endogenously, while these two
elements are both exogenous in Mookherjee and Ray (2010).
In the next section I illustrate the model. In the third section I derive the steady state
of the economy. I build a measure of inequality in the fourth section. I derive the dynamics
and compare steady states before and after a skill-biased technological shock in the ﬁfth
section. Finally, in the last section I conclude with a brief summary of my main results.
2 The Model
A small open economy is composed of a measure one of agents, all identical but starting
their lives with diﬀerent levels of wealth.
2.1 The Households.
Each individual is alive for two periods. During the ﬁrst one, she receives a bequest from
her parent and decides whether to get an education or not. If she chooses to go to school,
she'll be a skilled type; otherwise she'll be an unskilled type. In the second period she works,
earns a wage, consumes and bequeaths to her only child (see ﬁgure 1). The end-of-life utility
of an agent active at time t depends on her own consumption as well as on the wealth of
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her child.5 Deﬁne wst and w
u
t as the wage of a skilled and of an unskilled worker active in
period t. Deﬁne eit as the bequest made by the member of household i active in period t− 1
(agent {i, t−1}) to the one active in period t (agent {i, t}). Deﬁne the total wealth of agent
{i, t} as the sum of the resources available to her before consuming and bequeathing:
mit =
(eit − ξt−1)(1 + r) + wst if {i, t} is high skilledeit(1 + r) + wut if {i, t} is low skilled
where ξt−1 is the cost of eduction in period t− 1. It follows that a parent's utility is given
by:
U it = u(c
i
t) + βv(m
i
t+1) (1)
I assume that both functions u(.) and v(.) are identical CES:
U it =
(
cit
)1−σ
1− σ + β
(
mit+1
)1−σ
1− σ
As already mentioned in the introduction, the cost of education is endogenous. Children
can become unskilled workers for free, but becoming a skilled worker is costly. In each period
some skilled workers are employed as teachers, and each teaches to 1λ number of students.
Therefore the cost of education is given by ξt−1 = λwst−1.
In order to ﬁnance their education, people can borrow on the capital market using the
bequest received and their future wage as collateral. However, in case they do not pay back,
they will lose only a fraction 1− θ of their total wealth. Thus, they are not fully liable. If a
young individual goes to school without borrowing, or if she borrows and repays her loan,
her budget constraint is:
cit + e
i
t+1 = w
s
t + (e
i
t − λwst−1)(1 + r) (2)
If she borrows for school and does not repay, her budget constraint is:
cit + e
i
t+1 = θw
s
t (3)
If she does not go to school, her budget constraint is:
cit + e
i
t+1 = w
u
t + e
i
t(1 + r) (4)
Given this, banks will lend to agents only if the RHS of 2 is greater than the RHS of 3: access
5 This form of altruism is called paternalistic altruism. It implies that parents care about their direct
oﬀspring but not about distant generations. For details, see Mookherjee and Ray (2010).
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to the credit market and to school is determined by the bequest received at the beginning
of life. More precisely, people can become skilled if:
et ≥ λwst−1 − wst
(
1− θ
1 + r
)
(5)
Note that, although the parameter θ is taken as given, the existence of credit rationing
in the economy is determined endogenously. An economy with very severe credit constraints
in some periods could evolve toward a perfect credit market. Similarly, an economy with a
perfect credit market could later on develop some imperfections. Since inequality and credit
market imperfections are strictly interconnected, most of the analysis that follows will focus
on the long run evolution of equation 5.
Given the utility function and the budget constraint, it is possible to derive the ﬁrst
order conditions. In principle, there are several diﬀerent cases, depending on the profession
of the parent and on the profession of the child. However, the ﬁrst order conditions that
will be relevant in steady state are: skilled parents with skilled son, interior solution:
ei,st+1 =
1
ρ(1 + r) + 1
(
(eit − λwst−1)(1 + r) + wst (1 + ρ(1 + r)λ)− ρwst+1
)
(6)
skilled parents with skilled son, corner solution:
ei,st+1 = max
{
λwst − wst+1
(
1− θ
1 + r
)
, 0
}
(7)
unskilled parent with unskilled son, interior solution:
ei,ut+1 =
1
ρ(1 + r) + 1
(
eit(1 + r) + w
u
t − ρwut+1
)
(8)
and unskilled parent with unskilled son, corner solution:
ei,ut+1 = 0 (9)
where ρ ≡ [β (1 + r)]− 1σ .
Finally, I will show in the next section that, under fairly weak assumptions, both profes-
sions are always employed in production. This implies that becoming a skilled worker must
always be at least as proﬁtable as becoming an unskilled worker. In other words, the RHS
of 2 is always greater or equal than the RHS of 4:
wst − λwst−1(1 + r) ≥ wut (10)
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2.2 The Production Function.
The ﬁnal good is produced according to the following function:
Yt = K
α
t (atS

t + btU

t )
1−α
 (11)
where K is capital, S and U are skilled and unskilled workers employed in production, and
at and bt represent the productivity of the two types of workers. If both at and bt change by
the same amount, this translates into a change in the overall productivity on the economy.
Instead, variations to atbt reﬂect variations in the skill bias of the economy.
Markets are competitive and all inputs receive their marginal product:
r =
∂Yt
∂kt
= α
(
(atS

t + btU

t )
1

Kt
)1−α
(12)
wst =
∂Yt
∂St
= Kαt (1− α)(atSt + btU t )
1−α
 −1atS−1t (13)
wut =
∂Yt
∂Ut
= Kαt (1− α)(atSt + btU t )
1−α
 −1btU −1t (14)
I assume that  < 1. Under this condition the marginal product of labor at zero is
inﬁnity: no matter how high wages are, ﬁrms will always demand a strictly positive amount
of each type of labor. Note that if  ≤ 0 no production can occur unless all inputs are used.
If instead 0 <  < 1 production can, in principle, occur using only one type of workers.
Finally, whenever 1 − α >  the two types of workers are complements, while if 1 − α < 
they are substitutes.
Consistent with the literature, let's call the ratio of the two wages skill premium:
wst
wut
=
at
bt
(
Ut
St
)1−
(15)
2.3 Market Clearing Conditions.
I assume that the economy is small and that it can freely borrow and lend on the international
capital market. Under these assumptions, the domestic market clearing interest rate is equal
to the international one, and the capital market is always in equilibrium. In addition, by
Walras' law I can ignore the consumption good's market. It follows that the economy is in
equilibrium if the two labor markets and the education market clear.
The demand for skilled and unskilled workers is given by equations 13 and 14. The supply
depends on whether the returns on the two professions are equal or not. If agents prefer
to be skilled, the supply of skilled workers is given by the number of workers with wealth
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satisfying condition 5. If instead they are indiﬀerent, any agents with wealth satisfying
condition 5 can be either skilled or unskilled.
Proposition 1. Deﬁne Ft(e) as the c.d.f of the wealth distribution across the generation
active at period t. Whenever
wst − λwst−1(1 + r) > wut (16)
labor market clears if
Ut = Ft
(
λwst−1 −
wst (1− θ)
(1 + r)
)
(17)
1 = Ut + St + λSt+1 (18)
and equations 13 and 14 hold. If instead
wst − λwst−1(1 + r) = wut (19)
The labor market clears if there exists a measure µ such that
Ut = Ft
(
λwst−1 −
wst (1− θ)
(1 + r)
)
+ µ (20)
1 = Ut + St + λSt+1
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1− Ft
(
λwst−1 − w
s
t (1−θ)
(1+r)
)
and, again, 13 and 14 are satisﬁed.
Finally, in a competitive equilibrium, the education market clears as well. Using the ﬁrst
order conditions of the production sector, it is possible to write
wst = aχ
(
a+ b
(
Ut
St
)) 1−1
where
χ =
(α
r
) α
1−α
(1− α)
In other words, the labor-market clearing wage uniquely determines the skilled-to-unskilled
ratio in period t. Call Tt−1 the stock of teachers available in period t − 1. The stock of
skilled workers in period t is predetermined and equal to Tt−1λ . Some of these skilled workers
will work in production and other will work as teachers.
Proposition 2. In period t, the education market clears if:
St
Ut
≤
Tt−1
λ
1− Tt−1λ
(21)
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Nothing guarantees that condition 21 holds at the wages that clear the labor market:
the existence of a competitive equilibrium depends on the number of teachers existing at
the beginning of the period. One way to deal with this problem is to derive the set of initial
conditions that generates a competitive equilibrium. However, since in the remainder of
the paper I will be concerned with the steady state of the economy, I will use a shortcut
and prove (in appendix) that if a competitive equilibrium exists in period t + 1, a unique
competitive equilibrium exists in period t. This is enough to deﬁne a steady state in the
usual way since, in steady state, moving backward or forward in time is identical (provided
that the time subscripts are adjusted accordingly).
3 Steady State
Let's assume that the productivity parameters at and bt grow at the common constant rate
g.
Deﬁnition 3. The economy is in a steady state if the number of each type of workers
is constant, and aggregate output, aggregate capital, wages, and consumption grow at a
constant rate.
Deﬁnition 4. A steady state is equal if the returns on the two profession are equal. A
steady state is unequal if the two professions yield diﬀerent returns.
Since a steady state must also be a competitive equilibrium, it is quite straightforward
to see that in an unequal steady state the following properties must hold:
• The return on the skilled profession is higher than the return on the unskilled profes-
sion.
• Unskilled workers do not have access to credit (no-credit constraint).
• Either unskilled workers do not want to bequeath enough so that their children can
become skilled (no-deviation constraint), or it is impossible for them to do so (no-
negative-consumption constraint).
Lemma 5. In an unequal steady state the descendant of a skilled worker will be skilled, and
the descendant of an unskilled worker will be unskilled.
In other words, in a steady state each child inherits the profession of his parent,6 and the
economy is populated by skilled households and unskilled households.
6 I assume, without loss of generality, that this is the case also when the two professions yield the same
return.
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Lemma 6. Assume that at and bt grow at a constant rate g. In a steady state, consumption,
bequests, wages, and capital grow at a gross rate:
γ ≡ 1 + g
Using lemma 5 and lemma 6, I can rewrite the ﬁrst order conditions 6, 7, 8, and 9 as:
est+1,ss = w
s
t,ssmax
{
(1− ργ)(γ − λ(1 + r))
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ) , λ−
γ(1− θ)
1 + r
, 0
}
(22)
and
eut+1,ss = w
u
t,ssmax
{
γ(1− ργ)
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ) , 0
}
(23)
In order to guarantee the existence of a steady state, I need to impose some restrictions
on the parameters.
Assumption 7. The net return on the skilled profession is positive:
γ > λ(1 + r) (24)
Assumption 7 is equivalent to
wst+1,ss
1 + r
> λwst,ss
where the RHS is the cost of education in a steady state, and the LHS is the skilled wage
discounted by one period. This assumption implies that, in order for a steady state to exist,
the cost of education shouldn't be too high.
Note that assumption 7 would not be necessary if the cost of education were ﬁxed, as
in Mookherjee and Ray (2010). In that case, the skilled wage always adjusts in order to
persuade some people to get educated. Here, instead, the steady-state cost of education is
endogenous: whether the return on the skilled profession is positive does not depend on the
skilled wage but on condition 24.
Proposition 8. Under assumption 7, if the credit market works well enough
θ < 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
the economy has a unique steady state that is equal.
When proposition 8 holds, in a steady state everybody is able to borrow and pay for
education, even if they have zero wealth. It follows that the only possible steady state is
3 Steady State 13
Only unequal steady states
Unique equal steady state
Both equal and unequal steady states
Credit rationing possible
θ < 1− λ(1+r)
γ
θ > 1− λ(1+r)
γ
Perfect credit market
Condition 25 holds
Condition 25 does not hold
Fig. 2: Steady states.
the equal one.
Proposition 9. Assume the that credit market is imperfect:
θ > 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
Under assumption 7, if
1 + r − γ
1 + r
< γρ < 1 (25)
then the economy has a continuum of unequal steady states and one equal steady state.
Otherwise, the economy has a continuum of unequal steady states, but no equal steady state.
The proof of proposition 9 shows that, when credit market is imperfect, there are always
steady states where unskilled agents are too poor to borrow and too poor to leave bequests
high enough to allow their children to access education. Note that proposition 9 is consistent
with Mookherjee and Ray (2010) who ﬁnd, in a model where there is no credit market, that
unequal steady states always exist but the economy may or may not have an equal steady
state.
Condition 25 determines whether in the presence of credit market imperfection there
can be an equal stady state. When it holds, the agents' optimization problem has an
interior solution, in the sense that the optimal bequest level is computed using the ﬁrst order
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conditions. In other words, unskilled parents leave positive bequests and skilled parents leave
bequests strictly greater than the one necessary for their children to access education. Using
Mookherjee and Ray (2010) framework, one could say that parents leave both an educational
bequest and a ﬁnancial bequest : they leave the money required to access a profession plus
some assets. This implies that, if the returns on the two professions are equal, both types
of workers bequeath the same amount, and equality is possible in steady state. If instead
condition 25 does not hold, the agents' optimization problem has a corner solution where
skilled workers bequeath just enough so that their children can go to school, and unskilled
workers do not leave any bequest (again, one could say that parents leave only educational
bequests: only the money required to access a given profession). In this case there cannot
be an equal steady state, since a skilled parent would be better oﬀ by switching to zero
bequest, increasing their own consumption, and leaving his child income unchanged (but
forcing him to be unskilled).7 Therefore condition 25 is similar to what Mookherjee and
Ray (2010) call widespan condition.
Proposition 9 delivers the ﬁrst result of the paper. It shows that skill-biased technology
has nothing to do with the existence of long-run inequality. Quite intuitively, unequal steady
states exist if:
• The credit market functions poorly (high θ).
• The growth rate of the economy γ is low.
• The interest rate r is high.
• The cost of education λ is high.
Therefore, any impact that skill-biased technology may have on inequality is of secondary
order: it is relevant only if the other parameters are such that there is inequality in the ﬁrst
place.
Proposition 10. The set of steady state skill premia does not depend on ab .
The proof of proposition 10 shows that each of the constraints characterizing an unequal
steady state deﬁnes a set of skill premia. In other words, whether education is desirable,
whether it is possible to send children to school, or whether it is possible to access credit
depends on the skill premium. Since technology aﬀects the constraints only through the skill
premium, the steady-state skill premia are independent on the skill bias. Figure 3 depicts
one possible set of unequal steady states. When skill bias increases, the points A, B, and
7 One of the nice technical features of the model is that, in steady state, whether there is a corner solution
or not is independent on the wage level. This also implies that either both types of workers face a corner
solution or neither of them.
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Fig. 3: Unequal steady states.
C shift to the right and the distance between A and B, and B and C expand, so as to keep
the skill premium at the three points constant. Similarly, when skill bias decreases, the set
of unequal steady states shrinks. If inequality exists, changing ab will change the shape of
the unequal steady-states set, but the unequal steady-states set will continue to exist.
Proposition 10 contradicts one of Rigolini's claims. In a model with a continuum of
occupations, he shows that the only unequal steady state is the one where parents are
indiﬀerent between educating their children or not (as in point B of ﬁgure 3). He shows
that, after an increase in the overall growth rate of the economy, the steady state skill
premium may increase or decrease, depending on the parameters of the utility function.
The reason is that the return on education is higher: whether the demand for education
increases or not depends on the strength of the income and substitution eﬀects. He then
claims that the same holds true for a skill-biased technological change.
Rigolini's claim is not correct because skill-biased technological change has an additional
eﬀect on the wealth of unskilled workers. Unskilled parents do not want to leave a bequest
that is high enough to allow their children to go to school if
U(eut,ss(1 + r) + w
u
t,ss − eut+1,ss) + βU(eut+1,ss(1 + r) + wut+1,ss) ≥
U(eut,ss(1 + r) + w
u
t,ss − e?t+1,ss) + βU(wst+1,ss)
where
e?t+1 = w
s
t+1,ss
(
λ− (1− θ)γ
1 + r
)
is the amount of wealth a young agent needs to access education. The above expression can
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be rewritten as
T ≥ 1
1− σ
[(
R(1 + r) + 1− w
sγ
wu
O
)1−σ
+ β
(
γws
wu
)1−σ]
(26)
where
R = max
{
γ(1− ργ)
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ) , 0
}
O = λ− (1− θ)γ
1 + r
T =
1
1− σ
[
((1 + r − γ)R+ 1)1−σ + β ((1 + r)γR+ 1)1−σ
]
Therefore, the constraint depends on skill bias only through the skill premium. Also,
the RHS of inequality 26 is strictly concave in w
s
wu : the constraint is satisﬁed for higher skill
premium and lower skill premium. It follows that an increase in the skill premium decreases
the incentive to acquire education for low SU and increases it for high
S
U .
4 Inequality
Most of the papers dealing with skill-biased technological change use skill premium as a
measure for inequality. However, the features of this model make skill premium a bad proxy
for long-run inequality. For example, the cost of education is endogenous: if skill premium
goes up, but so does the cost of education, can we say that the economy is less equal? Skilled
workers will earn more but will pay more for becoming skilled workers. They may not gain
anything.
I build a measure of inequality based on Atkinson (1970). For a given social welfare
function W , deﬁne xeqW as the wealth level that, if equally distributed across all agents,
would achieve the current social welfare. Inequality can be measured as
µ = 1− x
eq
W
E(x)
(27)
where E(x) is the average wealth. This measure is always between zero and one, and it's
exactly zero when wealth is constant across agents. Furthermore, it is invariant with respect
to shifts in the average wealth. The interpretation of this measure is as follows: if µ = 0.7,
by distributing wealth equally we could achieve the very same level of social welfare, saving
70% of the current average wealth.
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Finally, I specify a particular social welfare function. I use a Rawlsian criterion:
W = miniU(x
i) (28)
This way, inequality measures the amount of wealth relative to the average wealth a social
planner can collect if he expropriates the surplus of everybody who owns more than the
poorest agent in the economy.
Lemma 11. In steady state, inequality is given by:
µ
(
U
S
)
=

(1+λ)
[
a
b (
U
S )
1−
(1− (1+r)λγ )−1
]
(1+λ) ab (
U
S )
1−
(1− (1+r)λγ )+US
if 1+r−γ1+r < γρ < 1
(1+λ)
[
a
b (
U
S )
1−
(1+ (1+r)λ(γ−1)γ −γ(1−θ))−1
]
(1+λ) ab (
U
S )
1−
(1+ (1+r)λ(γ−1)γ −γ(1−θ))+US
otherwise
(29)
Following Atkinson's intuition, the distribution of wealth can be seen as a lottery, and
the measure of inequality can be seen as a normalized risk premium. Using the inequality
measure to compare steady states having the same number of skilled and unskilled workers
but with diﬀerent wealth distributions is equivalent to comparing lotteries with two possible
outcomes, where the probability of each outcome stays constant but the particular realization
varies. Since the normalized risk premium and the inequality measure are invariant to shifts
in the mean of the distribution, this is simply a mean-preserving spread. Whereas any risk
averse agent has the same preference ranking over all the mean preserving spreads of a given
distribution, any concave social welfare function delivers the same ranking of steady states
in terms of inequality. Hence, the following lemma.
Lemma 12. In comparing inequality across economies with the same SU , the use of a Rawl-
sian social welfare function is without loss of generality.
Note also that, for given SU , inequality is a strictly increasing function of the diﬀerence
between the wealth of a skilled workers and the wealth of an unskilled worker, expressed as
fraction of total wealth. This implies that, ﬁxing SU , if inequality increases, the resulting
Lorentz curve will be nowhere above the original one. Hence the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Consider two economies in steady state having the same SU but diﬀerent wealth
distributions. The following statements are equivalent:
• Inequality is greater in economy 1 than in economy 2.
• The Lorenz curve of economy 1 is nowhere above the Lorentz curve of economy 2.
• The Gini coeﬃcient of economy 1 is greater than the Gini coeﬃcient of economy 2.8
8 This is, again, a proof that using a Rawlsian criterion is WLOG. See Atkinson (1970), p. 247.
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However, when using the inequality measure to compare steady states with diﬀerent
skilled-to-unskilled ratios, the results will be speciﬁc to the Rawlsian criterion and may not
generalize to other social welfare functions.
5 Stability
In models with a continuum of steady states, it is usually very diﬃcult to determine what
initial conditions lead to a particular steady state. Luckily, here it is possible to derive the
dynamics of the economy for some speciﬁc initial conditions.
Proposition 14. Consider an economy in a steady state having a skilled-to-unskilled ratio
p. If p is in the interior of the set of unequal steady states, after a permanent shock the
economy will converge again to p.
A permenent shock is, by deﬁnition, an arbitrarily small variation to one of the param-
eters of the economy. If the variation is very small, and p is in the interior, p remains a
steady state. The intuition behind proposition 14 is that, after a shock, unskilled workers
remain credit constrained. It follows that the number of skilled and unskilled workers re-
mains constant along the transition to the new steady state. Therefore, the economy can
only converge back to p. Let's now look at one speciﬁc type of shock: a variation in the
skill bias.
Proposition 15. Consider an economy in an unequal steady state. Assume that its skilled-
to-unskilled ratio is in the interior of the set of unequal steady states. After an arbitrarily
small increase in skill bias, this economy converges to a steady state where skill premium
and inequality are higher than before. Similarly, after an arbitrary decrease in skill bias,
this economy converges to a steady state where skill premium and inequality are lower.
Intuitively, keeping SU ﬁxed, inequality increases when skill bias (and, therefore, skill
premium) increases. The steady state wealth is a linear function of the wages of skilled and
unskilled workers, and skill bias matters only through the wages. Relative wealth depends
on skill bias only through the skill premium, exactly like in the short run case.
Therefore, for the steady states where it is possible to derive the dynamics, skill bias and
inequality move together. In addition, if we limit to arbitrarily small increase in skill bias,
the only point that is not a steady state anymore after a shock is point B in ﬁgure 3 (if it
exists). For all the other unequal steady states, proposition 15 holds. Finally, note that this
result does not depend on the particular social welfare function chosen, since, as discussed
on the preceding page, we are comparing inequality levels across economies having the same
S
U .
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What happen after ab increases when an economy is at point B in ﬁgure 3? My conjecture
is that the economy will converge to a new steady state B' having the same skill premium
but more skilled workers than B. Note that, before the shock, at point B unskilled parents
are indiﬀerent between sending their children to school or not. After the shock, they strictly
prefer to purchase education. Some unskilled workers become skilled until the skill premium
returns to the original one. At this point, unskilled workers are, again, indiﬀerent between
purchasing education or not. When keeping skill premium constant, inequality increases
if the number of skilled workers increases. This implies that, if the conjecture is correct,
inequality increases following an increase in the skill bias in this case too. However, it
is important to remember that the result depends on the speciﬁc social welfare function
chosen. Since a Rawlsian criterion is a special case, even if the conjecture is correct this
result is somehow fragile.
Given the fact that the economy has a continuum of unequal steady states, what happens
at point B may seem almost irrelevant. However, in models with an exogenous cost of
education by introducing a continuum of occupations (as in Mookherjee and Ray (2010)),
or random ability shocks (as in Mookherjee and Napel (2007)), or diﬀerent fertility rates
(as in Mookherjee, Prina, and Ray (2010)), the surviving unequal steady states are the
ones where unskilled agents are indiﬀerent between purchasing education or not, exactly
like at B. In light of these other works, it is important to fully understand what happens
to inequality at point B, using a general class of social welfare functions. Answering this
question is left for future work.
6 Conclusion
There is convincing evidence showing that, in the short run, skill-biased technological change
can increase inequality. However, very little is known about the long-run eﬀect of the
introduction of a skill-biased innovation. My paper aims at ﬁlling this gap.
I build an OLG model with several potential sources of inequality: skill-biased tech-
nology, imperfect credit market, exogenous productivity growth, altruism, and education
technology. I show that long-run inequality exists if the credit market functions poorly,
productivity growth is low, altruism is low, or the education technology is ineﬃcient. Sur-
prisingly, the existence of long-run inequality does not depend on the degree of skill bias of
the economy.
I build a measure of inequality based on Atkinson (1970) and I show that, if inequality
exists, after an increase in skill bias almost all the economies will converge to steady states
with a higher skill premium and higher inequality. Therefore, if long-run inequality exists,
short-run and long-run inequality move in the same direction. This result shows that the
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introduction of a skill biased technological innovation decades ago such as the computer
may partly be responsible for today's inequality.
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A Proofs of section 2.
A.1 Existence of the competitive equilibrium solving backward.
Consider a given sequence of bequests distributions {Ft(e)}∞t=1. Suppose that at time t+ 1
there exists a competitive equilibrium. In other words, take the wages wst+1 and w
u
t+1, the
number of teachers in period t + 1 as given. I will show that there exists a competitive
equilibrium in period t, therefore the problem can always be solved backward.
A Proofs of section 2. 22
In every period, wages are fully determined by the skilled-to-unskilled ratio. Using the
ﬁrst order conditions of the production sector, it is possible to write
wst = aχ
(
a+ b
(
Ut
St
)) 1−1
where
χ =
(α
r
) α
1−α
(1− α)
This implies two things:
• wst+1 and the number of teachers in period t + 1 uniquely determines the number of
skilled and unskilled workers in period t+ 1.
• StUt uniquely determines wst and, therefore, the cost of education for the generation
active in period t+ 1 (i.e. the generation that is young in period t).
Choose StUt such that the number of agents with access to the credit market is exactly equal
to the number of skilled workers in period t+ 1. This is an equilibrium if the return on the
skilled profession is greater than the return on the unskilled one in period t+ 1
wst ≤
1
λ(1 + r)
(wst+1 − wut+1)
If the above condition is not satisﬁed, choose a StUt such that
wst =
1
λ(1 + r)
(wst+1 − wut+1)
In this case, the number of agents with access to the credit market is higher than the number
of skilled agents in period t + 1. However, agents are indiﬀerent between becoming skilled
workers or unskilled workers: I can assume that exactly St+1+
1
λSt+2 agents become skilled.
Finally, the number of teachers in period t is given by the number of skilled workers in period
t+ 1.
Note that the above argument may not work if the distribution Ft+1(e) is discontinuous.
Suppose that there is a positive measure of agents receiving a particular bequest level e.
Imagine that when wst is such that
e = λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
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too many people have access to the credit market:
Ut+1 < Ft+1
(
λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
)
but if wst is such that
e > λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
too few people have access to the credit market:
Ut+1 > Ft+1
(
λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
)
In this situation, for a competitive equilibrium to exist I need to introduce a tie breaking
rule. Note that when
e = λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
banks are indiﬀerent about lending to agents with wealth e. I assume that the banking
sector will lend only to some of the agents with wealth equal to e. The fraction receiving a
loan is such that the number of unskilled workers next period is equal to Ut+1. This way,
if a competitive equilibrium exists in period t + 1, a competitive equilibrium exists also in
period t, no matter the distribution of wealth.
B Proofs of section 3.
B.1 Proof of lemma 5.
Since the total number of skilled and unskilled workers is a constant in steady state, there
can be social mobility only if two households swap occupations. Suppose that there is one
household with a skilled father and an unskilled son, and another household with a unskilled
father and a skilled son. Since agents prefer to be skilled, it must be the case that the son
of the unskilled worker has access to the credit market and the son of the skilled worker
does not. This implies that the unskilled father must be wealthier than the skilled father,
leading to a contradiction: if the unskilled father had access to the credit market he would
have chosen the skilled profession.
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B.2 Proof of lemma 6.
Consider equation 12 in steady state at time t. Take the log of both sides and subtract the
log of the same equation in t+ 1. The gross growth rate of capital is given by:
γ = 1 + g
Similarly, using equations 13 and 14, wages grow at the same rate γ. Finally, consider the
budget constraint of an unskilled agent in a steady state, in period t:
et+1,ss + ct,ss = wt,ss + et,ss(1 + r)
divide and multiply each element by itself one period earlier:
et,ssγe + ct−1,ssγc = wt−1,ssγ + et−1,ss(1 + r)γe
Since the budget constraint must also hold in period t− 1:
et,ss + ct−1,ss = wt−1,ss + et−1,ss(1 + r)
it must be the case that γ = γc = γe.
B.3 Proof of propositions 8, 9 and 10.
Lemma 16. Under assumption 7, if condition 25 holds, agents are unconstrained:
est+1,ss = w
s
t,ss
(1− ργ)(γ − λ(1 + r))
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
eut+1,ss = w
u
t,ss
γ(1− ργ)
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
Otherwise, the constraints are binding:
est+1,ss = w
s
t,ssmax
{
λ− γ(1− θ)
1 + r
, 0
}
eut+1,ss = 0
Proof. Skilled workers are unconstrained when
λ− γ(1− θ)
1 + r
<
(1− ργ)(γ − λ(1 + r))
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
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or
θ <
(
(1− ργ)(γ − λ(1 + r))
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
)
(1 + r)
γ
+ 1
by assumptions 7, when condition 25 holds the LHS is greater than one and the inequality
holds. Finally, for unskilled workers the conclusion follows simply by condition 25.
B.3.1 Proposition 8.
It follows simply because if
θ < 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
everybody can borrow.
B.3.2 Proposition 9.
Assume that credit market is imperfect:
θ > 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
• Case 1: agents are unconstrained (condition 25 holds).
There is an equal steady state if the returns on the two professions is equal:
1− λ(1 + r)
γ
=
wu
ws
(30)
There is an unequal steady state if the two professions yield diﬀerent returns:
wu
ws
< 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
unskilled workers cannot access the credit market:
wu
ws
<
(
λ− (1− θ)γ
1 + r
)(
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
γ(1− ργ)
)
and the no-negative-consumption constraint holds:
wu
ws
1
γ
<
(
λ− (1− θ)γ
1 + r
)(
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
(γ − 1)(1− ργ)(1 + r) + γ
)
Because of assumption 7, if the credit market is imperfect, there is always some SU that
satisﬁes the three inequalities above. However, note that the above constraints do not deﬁne
the set of unequal steady states. The extra constraint missing is the no-deviation constraint:
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parents should not want to bequeath enough so that their children cannot go to school,
whenever this deviation is possible. However, if a w
u
ws satisﬁes all the above constraints, this
wu
ws is an unequal steady state, since the no-negative-consumption constraints requires such
deviation not to be feasible.
• Case 2: agents are constrained (condition 25 does not hold).
Unskilled agents bequeath zero wealth and are not able to borrow: the no-credit constraint
is always satisﬁed. Note that there cannot be an equal steady state. This would correspond
to a situation where skilled workers bequeath just enough so that their children can to go
to school and unskilled workers leave no bequests. In this situation, if the returns on the
two professions are equal, skilled parents prefer to leave zero wealth: they can increase their
own consumption leaving their children income unchanged.
There is an unequal steady state if the return on one profession is strictly bigger than
the return on the other one:
wu
ws
< 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
and unskilled workers cannot bequeath enough so that their children can go to school:
wu
ws
1
γ
< 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
Note that by assumption 7, if credit market is imperfect and agents are constrained, there
is always some SU that satisﬁes both conditions. This
S
U is an unequal steady state.
B.3.3 Proof of proposition 10.
All the constraints relevant in an unequal steady state have already been derived in the
proof of proposition 9, except for the no-deviation constraint that is discussed in the main
text on page 15. All of them are a function of skill bias only through the skill premium.
It is interesting to note here that the set of skill premia satisfying the no-deviation
constraint has the shape (0, x′] ∪ [x′′, x′′′], while the set of skill premia satisfying the other
constraints has shape (0, x]. This implies that the set of unequal steady state that is between
B and C in ﬁgure 3 may not exist.
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C Proofs of section 4.
C.1 Proof of lemma 11.
The result follows from simple, but tedious, manipulations. By deﬁnition:
µ =
S(1 + λ)
[
(eSt,ss − λwSt−1,ss)(1 + r) + wSt,ss − eut,ss(1 + r)− wut,ss
]
S(1 + λ)((est,ss − λwst−1,ss)(1 + r) + wst,ss) + U(eut,ss(1 + r) + wu)
write wst−1,ss =
wst,ss
γ and e
i
t,ss =
eit+1,ss
γ for i = s, u. Assume that condition 25 holds and
plug in the ﬁrst order conditions 22 and 23 (using the fact that agents are unconstrained):
µ =
S(1 + λ)
[
wst,ss
(
A(γ − λ(1 + r)) (1+r)γ − λ(1+r)γ + 1
)
− wut,ss (A(1 + r) + 1)
]
S(1 + λ)wst,ss
(
A(γ − λ(1 + r)) (1+r)γ − λ(1+r)γ + 1
)
+ Uwut,ss (A(1 + r) + 1)
where
A =
(1− ργ)
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
Simplify the expression dividing both numerator and denominator by wu (A(1 + r) + 1):
µ =
(1 + λ)
[
ws
wu
(
1−
Aλ(1+r)2
γ +
λ(1+r)
γ
A(1+r)+1
)
− 1
]
(1 + λ)w
s
wu
(
1−
Aλ(1+r)2
γ +
λ(1+r)
γ
A(1+r)+1
)
+ US
and note that Aλ(1+r)
2
γ +
λ(1+r)
γ = (A(1 + r) + 1)
(
(1+r)λ
γ
)
.
In case condition 25 does not hold following the same steps, the solution is:
µ =
(1 + λ)
[
ws
wu
(
1 + λ(1 + r)
(
1− 1γ
)
− γ(1− θ)
)
− 1
]
(1 + λ)w
s
wu
(
1 + λ(1 + r)
(
1− 1γ
)
− γ(1− θ)
)
+ US
D Proofs of section 5.
D.1 Proof of proposition 14.
By assumption, before the shock the credit-constraint condition holds with a strict inequal-
ity:
eut > λw
s
t−1 − wst
(
1− θ
1 + r
)
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in the moment when the shock hit, there is an increase in wst . Clearly, because of the strict
inequality and because the shock is arbitrarily small, the above condition hold also after the
shock. It follows that, immediately after the shock, unskilled workers are unable to borrow.
For as long as unskilled workers cannot borrow, wages remain constant at their post-
shock level and bequests converge monotonically to the steady state bequests corresponding
to the same m and the new parameters. Since in the new steady state they cannot borrow,
and because the convergence is monotonic, there was no moment during the transition when
unskilled workers had access to the credit market. The economy must converge to the steady
state corresponding to the new parameters and the old m.
D.2 Proof of proposition 15.
Rewrite expression 29 as
µ =
(1 + λ)
[
ws
wuΨ− 1
]
(1 + λ)w
s
wuΨ +
U
S
where
Ψ =
(
1 + λ(1 + r)
(
1− 1
γ
)
− γ(1− θ)
)
taking derivative, it is possible to show that
∂µ
∂
(
ws
wu
) = 1− Ψ(1 + λ)wswu
Ψ(1 + λ)w
s
wu +
U
S
> 0
This implies that, for given SU , increasing
a
b increases inequality.
